中國在1974年共和黨人理查德·尼克松訪問中國之后，一直到2000年代初，一直是美國的朋友，這是真的嗎？

Sosow Nima
Yes!
是的！

First point, at that time, China was overwhelmed by the military pressure from the Soviet unx.
第一點，那時中國正承受著來自蘇聯(lián)的巨大軍事壓力。

To what extent? Let me give you some examples!
到底有多嚴重？讓我給你舉幾個例子！

Because the Sino-Soviet border had no natural defenses, China had to deploy a large amount of manpower to build artificial hills, attempting to delay the Soviet tank groups in front of the Yan Mountains.
由于中蘇邊界缺乏天然防御屏障，中國不得不投入大量人力修筑人工土丘，試圖在燕山前線拖延蘇聯(lián)坦克縱隊的推進。

China’s entire strategic defense was structured in three lines: the first line in the north, the second line along the Yangtze River, and the third line relying on mountain ranges for guerrilla warfare. Even a figure as brilliant as Mao Zedong said at the time, “If the third line isn’t built well, I won’t be able to sleep. Only when Panzhihua (a third-line defense base) is completed can I rest easy. Even if Beijing is lost, China still has Panzhihua.”
中國的總體戰(zhàn)略防御由三道防線構(gòu)成：第一道在北部，第二道沿長江而設(shè)，第三道依托山脈進行游擊戰(zhàn)。當時連毛澤東這樣卓越的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都說：“第三線要是沒修好，我這心里沒底。攀枝花一旦建成，我才能安心。即便北京丟了，中國還有攀枝花。”

The deployment back then was light in the front and heavy in the rear. On the Inner Mongolia front line, only two youth divisions—20,000 troops—were stationed, with the sole hope that they could provide early warning and hold off the Soviet army for two hours.
當時的部署是前線輕裝，后方重兵。內(nèi)蒙古前線僅駐扎兩支青年師——共約2萬人，唯一的期望是提前預(yù)警并拖住蘇軍兩小時。

The two most elite army groups were only intended to cover the retreat of the Central Committee and cultural relics from Beijing to the second line in Wuhan.
最精銳的兩個集團軍則負責(zé)掩護中央機關(guān)和文物從北京撤退到武漢第二道防線。

Nationwide, more than 6 billion grenades were produced, preparing to use human lives to resist Soviet tank assaults.
全國范圍內(nèi)生產(chǎn)了超過60億枚手榴彈，準備用人海戰(zhàn)術(shù)抵御蘇聯(lián)坦克沖擊。

When I was in college, the military textbooks still clearly treated the Soviet army as the hypothetical enemy.
我大學(xué)時的軍事教科書仍將蘇聯(lián)軍隊明確列為假想敵。

At the height of the pressure, China’s national defense forces neared 7 million, with over 50 million militia members.
在最緊張的時期，中國的國防力量接近700萬，民兵人數(shù)超過5000萬。

Second point, the United States was also afraid of the Soviet unx back then, wasn’t it?
第二點，那時美國也同樣懼怕蘇聯(lián)，不是嗎？

The Soviet unx was crazy at the time—a superpower like that, putting 30% or more of its GDP into the military.
那時的蘇聯(lián)簡直瘋狂——這樣一個超級大國，把30%甚至更多的GDP投入軍備。


(The scale of the Soviet military exercises at that time)
（當年蘇聯(lián)軍事演習(xí)的規(guī)模）


（China also immediately carried out exercises in response... However, to be honest, they really don't have the money... Their equipment can't compare with the Soviet unx...）
（中國也隨即進行了應(yīng)對演習(xí)……但老實說，他們確實沒那么多錢……裝備遠不及蘇聯(lián)……）

Everyone was scared of them; they were like a lunatic. (Compare that to China today, where military spending is 1.5% of GDP.)
所有人都懼怕蘇聯(lián)，他們簡直像個瘋子。（對比今天中國的軍費，僅占GDP的1.5%。）

So, at that time, cooperation between China and the United States made perfect sense—it was just everyone huddling together for warmth.
因此，當時中美合作才顯得那么理所當然——大家只不過是為了取暖而抱團。


David W. Rudlin
Kinda. Sorta.
有點算是，也不完全算是。

Maybe “cordial” is more accurate than “friend.”
或許用“友好”比用“朋友”更準確。

But let’s start with the fact that Nixon went to China in 1972, which is important because we still had troops fighting in Vietnam.
但我們先說個事實：尼克松在1972年訪華，這一點很重要，因為當時美軍還在越南作戰(zhàn)。

Against North Vietnamese troops who were supplied by… China.
對手是由……中國提供物資的北越軍隊。

So it’s probably best to describe the relationship as “complicated.”
所以，最恰當?shù)拿枋龃蟾攀恰皬?fù)雜”。

The “reopening” of China was an idea created by Henry Kissinger, who wanted China as a counterweight to Russia/to prevent Russia from using China as a counterweight to us.
“重新接觸”中國是亨利·基辛格的構(gòu)想，他希望中國能制衡蘇聯(lián)，或者防止蘇聯(lián)利用中國來制衡美國。

(Pause as we reflect on how little things change.)
（暫停一下，感受下事過境遷卻又似曾相識。）

It was the sort of realpolitik that we seem incapable of today, very much in the “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” school of international relations.
那種國際關(guān)系現(xiàn)實主義，如今我們似乎已無力而為，正是“敵人的敵人就是朋友”這一流派的典型代表。

Nixon himself said “what brought us together was not a convergence of ideas, but a convergence of interests.” And there were always times when those interests did not converge, e.g. in relation to Taiwan.
正如尼克松自己所言：“把我們拉到一起的，不是理念的契合，而是利益的契合?！倍谂_灣（地區(qū)）問題上，這種利益契合也曾多次破裂。

(Another pause to reflect…)
（再次暫停，細想一下……）

Researching this answer to make sure I had my facts right, I came across a Quizlet response that said the driving force was the potential for trade. I find this VERY hard to believe. China was stubbornly communist until Deng rose to power and influence (though never became the official leader of the country) in 1978.
為了確認事實，我查到一個Quizlet說訪華的驅(qū)動力是貿(mào)易潛力。我很難相信這一點。直到1978年鄧小平崛起并掌握影響力之前，中國一直頑固地奉行共產(chǎn)主義（雖然他從未成為國家正式領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人）。

I can’t put a date on when things began to change because he didn’t actually say the “To become rich is glorious” quote that’s credited to him. What I can say is that the west’s excitement about “1.2 billion pairs of shoes” era didn’t begin until the early-to-mid 1980’s, and on my first trip in 1983 I was stunned by how poor the place was.
我沒法給出確切的轉(zhuǎn)折年份，因為他并未真正說過那句“致富光榮”的名言。我能確定的是，西方對“中國12億只鞋子”時代的熱情要到80年代中期才開始；我1983年首訪時，就被那里的貧窮震撼到了。

Moreover Kissinger wasn’t noted for his interest in economic matters.
況且基辛格也并不以關(guān)心經(jīng)濟事務(wù)著稱。

I’d say an argument could be made that the friendship began in 2001, when China joined the WTO (after trying for more than a decade). And while the world’s two biggest economies will always have some tensions, it’s sad to see how adversarial we have become in recent years.
我認為，也可以說真正的“友好”始于2001年中國加入世貿(mào)組織（那之前嘗試了十多年）。盡管世界兩大經(jīng)濟體間難免有摩擦，但近年來我們對立得如此激烈，實在令人惋惜。

An opportunity wasted, for both countries.
對兩國而言，這都是一次錯失的機遇。


Steven Mak
China wants to be in a friendly term with every nation in the world, including Britain and Japan. It was the US cannot accept China’s peaceful rise.
中國希望與世界上所有國家保持友好關(guān)系，包括英國和日本。而無法接受中國和平崛起的，正是美國。

Neel Kumar
Even today, China is America’s friend.
縱使時至今日，中國仍是美國的朋友。

Chinese people labor in factories working 9am-9pm, 6 days a week (also known as 9–9–6) to produce all sorts of goods from clothes and towels to keyboards, computers, laptops, motors etc for sale in the US. What do they get back? US dollars, a fiat currency created by the US government.
中國人在工廠里實行朝九晚九、每周六天的“9–9–6”工作制，生產(chǎn)從衣物、毛巾到鍵盤、電腦、筆記本、馬達等各類商品，遠銷美國。他們換回的是什么？是美國政府發(fā)行的法定貨幣——美元。

And what do the Chinese buy with these US dollars? Well, they buy oil, coal, bauxite, copper, iron ore, iron, steel, and lots of other things to make more products to sell to the US. And the rest of the US dollars? They buy US government bonds with them. The same US government that keeps increasing its debt.
中國人用這些美元買什么？他們購買石油、煤炭、鋁土礦、銅、鐵礦、鋼鐵，以及其他原材料，再生產(chǎn)更多商品賣給美國。至于剩余的美元？他們用來購買美國政府債券——而這些債券的發(fā)行方，正是不停加杠桿的美國政府。

If it weren’t for the Chinese selling us cheap jeans, cheap pots and pans, cheap computers, cheap furniture, and cheap toys, the American public would be doing without or going into serious debt.
若不是中國向美國出口平價牛仔褲、實惠廚具、高性價比電腦、經(jīng)濟型家具和物美價廉的玩具，美國民眾恐怕要么捉襟見肘，要么債臺高筑了。


Mike Martino
Nixon’s first term was an incredibly effective one, rather like Biden’s administration in terms of impartial “political accomplishment,” and opening diplomatic relations with “Red China” was a masterful stroke of diplomacy.
尼克松的第一個任期極其高效，就像拜登政府在“政治成就”方面看似公正一樣，而與“紅色中國”建交則是一記外交妙手。

But it was just the first step. It was 1979(/1980) when the USA actually established the China “Most Favored Nation” trade policy.
但那只是第一步。直到1979年（或1980年），美國才真正確立對華“最惠國待遇”貿(mào)易政策。

Both countries have been benefiting dramatically ever since, with a bit of the sort of “friendly adversarial” relationship one would expect in any major business alliance between powerful and self-interested corporations.
此后，雙方互利共贏，維系著那種既“友好”又“有競爭”的關(guān)系，就像兩家強勢且各有私利的大公司結(jié)盟時常見的模式。