文字整理：
 
The U.S.-China geopolitical contest, which the United States has launched, is driven by deep structural forces. And I want to emphasize that, because, you know, if you notice, President Donald Trump started this contest, right? He was defeated in the election. President Joe Biden came in. He disagreed with Donald Trump on everything, except on China. And on China, President Joe Biden has not been able to lift a single tariff on China. Not once. That shows that personalities is not what's driving this contest. It's structural forces. And we must understand these structural forces. So what are the structural forces? There are at least three. The first is that, and this is an iron law of Geopolitics.. That has been around for 2,000, maybe 3,000 years. Whenever the world's number one emerging power, which today is China, is about to overtake the world's number one power, which today is the United States, the world's number one power always pushes down the world's number one emerging power.
 
美中地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是由美國發(fā)起的，受到深層結(jié)構(gòu)性力量的驅(qū)動(dòng)。
我想強(qiáng)調(diào)這一點(diǎn)，因?yàn)槿绻阕⒁獾剑乩势湛偨y(tǒng)啟動(dòng)了這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，對(duì)吧？他在選舉中被擊敗。拜登總統(tǒng)上臺(tái)后，他幾乎在所有問題上都與特朗普意見相左，除了對(duì)華政策。在對(duì)華問題上，拜登總統(tǒng)未能取消任何一項(xiàng)對(duì)中國的關(guān)稅，一次也沒有。這表明，推動(dòng)這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的不是個(gè)人因素，而是結(jié)構(gòu)性力量。我們必須理解這些結(jié)構(gòu)性力量。那么，這些結(jié)構(gòu)性力量是什么？
至少有三個(gè)。
首先，這是一個(gè)地緣政治的鐵律，存在了兩千年，或許三千年。每當(dāng)世界第一新興大國——今天是中國——即將超越世界第一大國——今天是美國——時(shí)，世界第一大國總是會(huì)打壓新興大國。

And this has been happening for 2,000 years. So in some ways, when the United States... The United States is trying, fighting so hard to retain its number one position, it's actually behaving very normally. This is what all great powers have done for thousands of years. But what is puzzling, you know, and I say this because I've been in the United States now for one week. And I am actually surprised that even though, and as I explain later, it may not necessarily be in the United States' interest to launch this contest against China, there is a rock-solid consensus in the American body politic. And when I speak to so many Americans here, and I've been here for one week now, they seem determined to stand up to China, even though it may not necessarily be in the American interest. So this is what, in many ways, is driving this contest, this enormous desire of the United States to remain number one in the world.
 
這種情況已經(jīng)持續(xù)了兩千年。所以在某種程度上，當(dāng)美國如此努力地爭(zhēng)取保持其世界第一的地位時(shí)，它實(shí)際上是在非常正常地行事。
這是幾千年來所有大國都會(huì)做的事情。但令人困惑的是，我之所以這么說，是因?yàn)槲以诿绹艘恢?。我驚訝地發(fā)現(xiàn)，我稍后會(huì)解釋的，發(fā)起這場(chǎng)對(duì)中國的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)未必符合美國的利益，但美國政界卻有著堅(jiān)如磐石的共識(shí)。我在這兒待了一周，與許多美國人交談，他們似乎都決心對(duì)抗中國，即使這未必符合美國的利益。所以，這在很大程度上推動(dòng)了這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，美國對(duì)保持世界第一的強(qiáng)烈愿望。
 
So that's the first factor that's making it inevitable. The second factor that's making this contest inevitable is the first one, by the way, I want to emphasize, everybody talks about it. I mean... Mr. Wang Huiya mentioned Graham Allison. He's also written a book, as you know, about the inevitability of war within the U.S. and China. And then he talks about this, what he calls the Thucydides Trap. So the first point I made, everybody knows about. But the second point I'm going to make, nobody talks about. Especially in the U.S. Because it's politically incorrect to mention it. Because the second structural force, that's driving this contest, is what I call the fear of the yellow peril. Now the fear of the yellow peril has laid buried in the Western imagination for 800 years. And by the way, I want to explain that this fear is not an imagination of mine, because it has surfaced in the U.S.
 
因此，這是使得這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不可避免的第一個(gè)因素。
第二個(gè)因素，順便說一下，我想強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，第一個(gè)因素人人都談?wù)?。王輝亞（音譯）先生提到過格雷厄姆·艾利森，他寫了一本書，討論了美中之間戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的不可避免性。他稱之為“修昔底德陷阱”。所以我提到的第一個(gè)因素，大家都知道了。
但我要說的第二個(gè)因素，沒人談?wù)?，特別是在美國，因?yàn)樘岬剿谡紊喜徽_。因?yàn)橥苿?dòng)這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的第二個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)性力量，是我所謂的“黃禍”恐懼。這種“黃禍”恐懼在西方想象中潛伏了800年。順便說一句，我想解釋一下，這種恐懼不是我憑空想象的，因?yàn)樗诿绹呀?jīng)浮出水面。
 
It has surfaced in American history. And about 130 years ago, you should know this historical fact, the United States Congress passed an act called the Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. Let me repeat that. The Chinese Racial Exclusion Act. So that is a very powerful demonstration of the fear of the yellow peril. So when we try to analyze and understand this U.S.-China contest, we try to look for the rational factors that are driving it. But there are also emotional factors. And these emotional factors are also very powerful. And when I said earlier that having been in the United States now for one week, I can feel the emotions towards China have become very, very negative. But I have to be here to feel it, to absorb it before I can confirm it. And that's what I've experienced. This very powerful, emotional reaction to China. And the third structural force that's also driving this contest, and they're all different.
 
這種恐懼在美國歷史上已經(jīng)顯現(xiàn)。大約130年前，你應(yīng)該知道這個(gè)歷史事實(shí)，美國國會(huì)通過了一項(xiàng)名為《排華法案》的法律。我再重復(fù)一遍，《排華法案》。這非常有力地證明了“黃禍”恐懼的存在。因此，當(dāng)我們?cè)噲D分析和理解美中競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)，我們會(huì)尋找推動(dòng)它的理性因素。但也有情感因素，這些情感因素同樣非常強(qiáng)大。
我之前提到，在美國待了一周后，我能感覺到對(duì)中國的負(fù)面情緒非常強(qiáng)烈。但我必須親身在這里感受、體會(huì)，才能確認(rèn)這一點(diǎn)。這就是我的體驗(yàn)，對(duì)中國非常強(qiáng)烈的情感反應(yīng)。
 
第三個(gè)推動(dòng)這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)構(gòu)性力量也不同。
 
One is ancient, one is yellow peril, and the third one is a kind of a bipartisan disappointment in the United States that American engagement with China has not created a liberal democracy in China. Now, this is, again, not something I'm imagining, because as you will see in my book, when you read it, I quote a very important, actually he's now a very important American official in the Biden administration. His name is Kurt Campbell. And he published an essay. He published an essay in the magazine Foreign Affairs, I think, with another official called Ellie Redner. And he said that the Americans believed that when America engaged China, when America opened up China economically, after America opened up China economically, China would also open up politically. China would become a liberal democracy. And America and China would live happily. Ever after. Now, as you can tell from the way I'm saying it, it sounds like a fairy tale.
 
一個(gè)是古老的規(guī)律，一個(gè)是“黃禍”恐懼，第三個(gè)是美國兩黨對(duì)美國與中國的接觸未能使中國成為自由民主國家的失望。
這也不是我的想象，因?yàn)檎缒阍谖业臅袝?huì)看到的，我引用了一位非常重要的人物，他現(xiàn)在是拜登政府中的一位重要官員，名叫庫爾特·坎貝爾。他發(fā)表了一篇《外交事務(wù)》雜志的文章，我想是與另一位官員艾莉·拉特納共同撰寫的。他說，美國人相信，當(dāng)美國與中國接觸、美國在經(jīng)濟(jì)上向中國開放后，中國也會(huì)在政治上開放。中國會(huì)成為自由民主國家，然后美國和中國會(huì)幸福地生活下去。從我說的語氣中，你可以看出，這聽起來像個(gè)童話。

And it is a fairy tale. Because in many ways, it's very puzzling. And this is what my book tries to do, to try and, in a sense, explain Chinese history to the Americans. That how is it a country like the United States, which is only less than 250 years old, right? Less than 250 years old. With one quarter of the population of China, America believed, hey, we, America, we can change China, which has got a population four times the size of China, and a history that is 4,000 years old at least, maybe 5,000 years. So what was behind this American belief that this young American republic could transform, one of the most ancient civilizations that we have today? But that in itself is an indication of the misunderstandings that Americans have, which is what my book tries to point out. So I hope you understand that there are deep structural forces that are driving this contest.
 
這確實(shí)是一個(gè)童話。因?yàn)樵诤芏喾矫妫@非常令人費(fèi)解。這正是我的書試圖做的，在某種意義上向美國人解釋中國的歷史。
一個(gè)像美國這樣只有不到250年歷史的國家，人口僅為中國的四分之一，美國卻相信，嘿，我們美國可以改變中國，一個(gè)人口是美國四倍、歷史至少有4000年、可能5000年的國家。這種美國信念的背后是什么？這個(gè)年輕的美國共和國認(rèn)為自己可以改變當(dāng)今最古老的文明之一？這本身就表明了美國人對(duì)中國的誤解，這正是我的書試圖指出的。所以我希望你們理解，推動(dòng)這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的深層結(jié)構(gòu)性力量。
 
Is that paradoxically, again, this is another paradox. Even though the United States has launched this contest against China, it doesn't have a strategy. I mean, I'm not exaggerating this. In fact, as I explain in my book, and I'm sure Mr. Wang Huyao noticed it, I happened to have a one-on-one lunch with America's greatest living strategic thinker, Henry Kissinger. And at that lunch, he said to me, you know, and he allowed me to quote me, quote him as saying that, that the United States doesn't have a strategy. For managing China. But even if he hadn't said it to me, it's pretty obvious. Because when America launched this geopolitical contest against China, it hasn't specified what are its obxtives. What does America hope to accomplish in launching this contest against China? Right? It could be, number one, isolating China from the rest. The rest of the world, as it succeeded in doing with the Soviet unx, containing the Soviet unx.
 
矛盾的是，這又是一個(gè)悖論。盡管美國發(fā)起了這場(chǎng)對(duì)中國的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，但它沒有一個(gè)明確的戰(zhàn)略。我不是在夸大其詞。
事實(shí)上，正如我在書中解釋的，我相信王輝亞先生也注意到了，我曾與美國最偉大的在世戰(zhàn)略思想家亨利·基辛格共進(jìn)午餐。他在午餐時(shí)對(duì)我說，他允許我引用他的話，美國沒有應(yīng)對(duì)中國的戰(zhàn)略。即使他不告訴我，這也很明顯。因?yàn)楫?dāng)美國發(fā)起這場(chǎng)對(duì)中國的地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)，它沒有明確目標(biāo)。美國希望通過這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)實(shí)現(xiàn)什么？
可能是第一，孤立中國，與世界其他國家隔絕，就像它成功遏制蘇聯(lián)一樣。
 
It could be overthrowing the communist Party of China. It could be preventing China from becoming the number one economy in the world. And I suggest these three obxtives, because if you analyze them, none of these three obxtives are achievable. Now, if you want to launch a contest, you must have very clear, very clear obxtives. What are you trying to accomplish? And the United States has never specified, and has never, unfortunately for itself, understood what it wants to do vis-a-vis China. And so that's the other paradox about the United States' decision to launch this contest against China. But having said that, let me now turn to the other half of the first paradox I spoke about, which is, is that while it is inevitable, it is also avoidable. So why is this contest avoidable? And there are several reasons. In fact, in my last chapter of my book, I talk about the five non-contradictions.
 
可能是推翻……?？赡苁亲柚怪袊蔀槭澜绲谝淮蠼?jīng)濟(jì)體。我提出了這三個(gè)目標(biāo)，因?yàn)槿绻惴治鏊鼈?，這三個(gè)目標(biāo)沒有一個(gè)是可實(shí)現(xiàn)的。
現(xiàn)在，如果你想發(fā)起一場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，你必須有非常明確的目標(biāo)。你想實(shí)現(xiàn)什么？不幸的是，美國從未明確說明，也從未理解它想對(duì)中國做什么。這就是美國決定發(fā)起這場(chǎng)對(duì)華競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的另一個(gè)悖論。
但說了這些，讓我轉(zhuǎn)向我提到的第一個(gè)悖論的另一半，即這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)雖然看似不可避免，但也是可以避免的。為什么這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可以避免？有幾個(gè)原因。事實(shí)上，在我書的最后一章，我談到了在美中之間五個(gè)“非矛盾”。
 
between U.S. and China, and I hope if you have a chance to read the book, please look at the five non-contradictions. By the way, the phrase non-contradiction itself is a very clumsy English phrase that is very rarely used, but I use it just to explain why this is so unusual, because there's actually no fundamental reason why the U.S. and China should clash with each other. And so let me give you two examples of why the United States and China should not clash with each other. The first reason is that if the fundamental national interest of the United States and if the fundamental national interest of China is to improve the well-being of their people, to make them improve their living standards and make them better and so on, and so forth, then frankly, the U.S. and China should be working together because they have a common interest in improving the well-being of their people.
 
我希望如果你有機(jī)會(huì)讀這本書，請(qǐng)看看這五個(gè)“非矛盾”。順便說一句，“非矛盾”這個(gè)詞本身是一個(gè)很拙劣的英語表達(dá)，很少使用，但我用它來解釋為什么這很不尋常，因?yàn)槊乐兄g實(shí)際上沒有根本理由必須發(fā)生沖突。所以讓我舉兩個(gè)例子說明為什么美中不應(yīng)該沖突。第一個(gè)原因是，如果美國和中國的根本國家利益是改善人民福祉，提高生活水平，讓人民生活得更好等等，那么坦白說，美中應(yīng)該合作，因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)诟纳迫嗣窀ｌ矸矫嬗泄餐妗?br />
And if they cooperate, if they trade with each other, they will get better, right? And the tragedy here is that the United States is the only major developed country where the average income... of the bottom 50, 5-0, 50, 5-0 percent has not improved for three decades. And the living conditions of the bottom 50 percent have deteriorated. In fact, there's another Nobel laureate, Angus Deaton, whom I quote in my book, who's published a book called Deaths of Despair. And he talks about how, you know, all the indicators, all the indicators of well-being are deteriorating in America. Life expectancy is coming down, shocking, in a major developed country, right? And poverty is growing. Suicides are growing. That's very sad. So all this, if the primary interest of the United States is to improve the well-being of its people, it should logically press the...
 
如果他們合作，相互貿(mào)易，情況會(huì)變得更好，對(duì)吧？這里的悲劇是，美國是唯一一個(gè)主要發(fā)達(dá)國家——其底層50%人口的平均收入在過去三十年沒有改善。底層50%的生活條件惡化了。事實(shí)上，我在書中引用了另一位諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)得主安格斯·迪頓，他出版了一本書《絕望之死》。他談到美國的福祉指標(biāo)都在惡化。預(yù)期壽命下降，這在一個(gè)主要發(fā)達(dá)國家是令人震驚的，對(duì)吧？貧困在增加，自殺率也在上升。這很悲哀。所以，如果美國的首要利益是改善人民福祉，它應(yīng)該邏輯上按下……
 
cross-button on the geopolitical contest against China, and actually war with China, to improve the well-being of its people. And as you'll see in the book, I discuss that in some detail, of how they can cooperate on things like infrastructure and other areas to improve their well-being. So that's one area where there's a non-contradiction. The second area where there's a non-contradiction, and where actually U.S. and China are in conflict, is the U.S.-China relationship. The third area where actually U.S. and China should work together is in the area of global challenges. And clearly, United States and China face common global challenges. And we've seen this in COVID-19, right? COVID-19 has shown how much the world has shrunk, and how much we are all, as Kofi Annan, the late U.N. Secretary General, would say, we are now living in the same global village.
 
暫停地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的按鈕，甚至避免與中國發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，以改善其人民的福祉。正如你在書中看到的，我詳細(xì)討論了他們?nèi)绾卧诨A(chǔ)設(shè)施等領(lǐng)域合作，以改善福祉。這是第一個(gè)沒有矛盾的領(lǐng)域。
第二個(gè)沒有矛盾的領(lǐng)域，也是美中實(shí)際存在沖突的領(lǐng)域，是美中關(guān)系。
第三個(gè)美中應(yīng)該合作的領(lǐng)域是全球挑戰(zhàn)。顯然，美國和中國面臨共同的全球挑戰(zhàn)。我們?cè)谛鹿谝咔橹锌吹搅诉@一點(diǎn)，對(duì)吧？新冠疫情顯示了世界變得多么得小，正如已故聯(lián)合國秘書長科菲·安南所說，我們現(xiàn)在生活在同一個(gè)全球村落。
 
It's no longer a huge planet. This is one small global village. So anything that happens to us affects all of us. So we should be cooperating. If you live in a village, you should be cooperating to fight against the common dangers, whether it's COVID-19, or if it's climate change. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. And you cannot solve climate change unless U.S. and China collectively work together. and China collaborate. So you can see there are very powerful reasons why US and China should collaborate.
 
這不再是一個(gè)巨大的星球，而是一個(gè)小小的全球村落。所以，發(fā)生在我們身上的任何事情都會(huì)影響到所有人。因此，我們應(yīng)該合作。如果我們生活在一個(gè)村子里，我們應(yīng)該合作對(duì)抗共同的威脅，無論是新冠疫情還是氣候變化。除非美國和中國共同努力，否則無法解決氣候變化問題。因此，你可以看到，美中合作的理由非常有力。
 
So that's what I'm trying to achieve in my book, to try and persuade both countries please press the pause button on what you are doing and focus on cooperating because that's what the world wants you to do. And that brings me to the next important point I want to make because you notice I just said that's what the world wants you to do because I have a whole chapter in my book which says that out of the 7.8 billion people in the world, there are 330 million who live in the United States, there are 1.4 billion who live in China, but there are still 6 billion people who live outside the United States and China. And these 6 billion people, you ask them privately, confidentially would you like the US-China geopolitical contest to accelerate? Or would you like US and China to stop this contest? And I can tell you that the overwhelming majority of the 6 billion people who live outside US and China want both countries to say stop this contest because it is not helping anybody.
 
這就是我在書中試圖實(shí)現(xiàn)的目標(biāo)，試圖說服兩國暫停目前的行動(dòng)，專注于合作，因?yàn)檫@是世界的期望。這引出了我要說的下一個(gè)重點(diǎn)，因?yàn)槲覄倓偺岬竭@是世界的期望。
我書中有一整章提到，全球78億人口中，美國有3.3億，中國有14億，但還有60億人生活在美中之外。如果你私下、秘密地問這60億人，你希望美中地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加速嗎？還是希望美中停止這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)？我可以告訴你，絕大多數(shù)生活在美中之外的60億人希望兩國說：停止這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，因?yàn)樗鼘?duì)任何人都沒有幫助。

It is not helping the United States. It is not helping China and is not helping the rest of the world and I can tell you as someone who lives in Southeast Asia which is still South China, if you if you did a poll of the 650 million people who live in ASEAN they will say that they want this contest to pause because the Southeast Asian countries want to have good relations with United States and they want to have good good relations with China, and they don't want to be forced to choose. And that's the view of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. So in that sense, I hope that my book will be helpful to both US and China, because it will help to persuade them that given the larger global challenges that we face, let's come together, work together, and defeat these common challenges, and press the pause button on this geopolitical contest. Thank you very much.
 
這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)美國沒有幫助，對(duì)中國沒有幫助，對(duì)世界其他地區(qū)也沒有幫助。作為一個(gè)生活在東南亞——也就是中國南邊的人，我可以告訴你，如果你在東盟6.5億人口中做民調(diào)，他們會(huì)說希望這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)暫停，因?yàn)闁|南亞國家希望與美國保持良好關(guān)系，也希望與中國保持良好關(guān)系，他們不想被迫選擇。這也是世界絕大多數(shù)人口的觀點(diǎn)。
因此，我希望我的書能對(duì)美中兩國有所幫助，因?yàn)樗鼘⒄f服兩國，面對(duì)更大的全球挑戰(zhàn)，讓我們團(tuán)結(jié)起來，共同努力，戰(zhàn)勝這些共同挑戰(zhàn)，暫停這場(chǎng)地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。非常感謝。
 
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