QA回答：美國軍隊(duì)最大的資產(chǎn)是什么？

What is the USA military’s greatest asset?

2025-04-10 Phelps 5407 28 5 收藏糾錯(cuò)&舉報(bào)

譯文簡介

網(wǎng)友：沒有其他國家擁有像美國這樣的后勤鏈。其他國家可能會(huì)制造特定的武器系統(tǒng)來與我們匹敵，或者擁有龐大的數(shù)量來挑戰(zhàn)我們，但沒有人能像美國那樣進(jìn)行力量投射。

正文翻譯

沒有其他國家擁有像美國這樣的后勤鏈。其他國家可能會(huì)制造特定的武器系統(tǒng)來與我們匹敵，或者擁有龐大的數(shù)量來挑戰(zhàn)我們，但沒有人能像美國那樣進(jìn)行力量投射。

評論翻譯

Damien Leimbach
The US military’s greatest super power is the same as Bruce Wayne’s.

美國軍隊(duì)最強(qiáng)大的超能力和布魯斯·韋恩的一樣。
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Their giant ass bank account.

他們那龐大的銀行賬戶。

They also share an almost pathological need to right wrongs, and mete out justice. That gets them both into some pretty dark territory, but it's always done with their hearts in the right place.

他們還都有一種近乎病態(tài)的糾正錯(cuò)誤和伸張正義的需求。這讓他們都陷入了一些相當(dāng)黑暗的境地，但他們的出發(fā)點(diǎn)總是好的。

What do we buy with our superpower bank account?

我們用我們超級大國的銀行賬戶買什么？

What that money buys is competency.

這些錢買來的是能力。

People unfamiliar with this issue often look at the size of the budget and wonder why we spend so much more than other nations, or why we always seem to need more money for the military.

不熟悉這個(gè)問題的人經(jīng)常看到預(yù)算的規(guī)模，就會(huì)想知道為什么我們比其他國家花費(fèi)更多，或者為什么我們似乎總是需要更多的軍費(fèi)。

We can talk about global force projections and the law that requires the US to have 10 operational super carriers at any one time. We can talk about the technical edge that research and development gives us. We can talk about manpower and raw numbers of tanks........but these are distractions. The real commodity purchased with that money is competency.

我們可以談?wù)撊蛄α客渡湟约耙竺绹谌魏螘r(shí)候都擁有10艘可操作的超級航母的法律。我們可以談?wù)撗邪l(fā)帶來的技術(shù)優(yōu)勢。我們可以談?wù)撊肆吞箍说臄?shù)量……但這些都是轉(zhuǎn)移注意力的東西。用這些錢購買的真正商品是能力。

Even though our military spends as much money as the next 15 countries combined, the US, generally speaking, does not have as many tanks, airplanes, and soldiers as the next 15 counties combined. So where does the money go?

盡管我們的軍隊(duì)花費(fèi)的錢相當(dāng)于接下來15個(gè)國家的總和，但總的來說，美國擁有的坦克、飛機(jī)和士兵數(shù)量并沒有接下來15個(gè)國家的總和多。那么錢都去哪兒了？
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We buy practice. We buy spare parts. We buy fuel. We buy bombs to drop on a training range.

我們購買訓(xùn)練。我們購買備件。我們購買燃料。我們購買用于在訓(xùn)練場投擲的炸彈。

American fighter pilots fly more training hours in a month than most pilots from other countries will in a year. That's expensive. That cost fuel, it costs spare parts, it costs in terms of mechanics who must be trained, facilities that must be kept up.......that's where that money goes. Other nations might have a similar raw numbers of planes, but they don't have the number of trained mechanics, pilots and ready airfields around the world that we do.

美國戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)飛行員一個(gè)月內(nèi)的訓(xùn)練飛行小時(shí)數(shù)比大多數(shù)其他國家的飛行員一年的訓(xùn)練飛行小時(shí)數(shù)還要多。這很昂貴。這需要燃料、備件，還需要接受培訓(xùn)的機(jī)械師以及必須維護(hù)的設(shè)施……這就是錢的去向。其他國家可能擁有相似數(shù)量的飛機(jī)，但他們沒有我們擁有的那么多訓(xùn)練有素的機(jī)械師、飛行員和遍布全球的可用機(jī)場。

Another thing we buy is the ability to deploy around the world at a moments notice. When was the last time Russia or China plopped an Air Wing or Tank Battalion off in a foreign country? Its not that they don't covet that capability or have regional territorial ambitions, its that they just don't have it (the capability) the way we do. That costs money.

我們購買的另一件事是隨時(shí)在全球部署的能力。俄羅斯或中國上次在外國部署一個(gè)空軍聯(lián)隊(duì)或坦克營是什么時(shí)候？并不是說他們不渴望這種能力或沒有地區(qū)領(lǐng)土野心，而是他們根本沒有我們擁有的那種能力。這需要錢。

Maintaining bases around the world is expensive. I can only think of a few other countries besides the US that maintains active duty combat units at military bases on foreign soil at all. The US has 38.

在全球維持軍事基地是昂貴的。除了美國之外，我只能想到少數(shù)幾個(gè)在外國領(lǐng)土的軍事基地維持現(xiàn)役作戰(zhàn)部隊(duì)的國家。美國有38個(gè)。

Lastly, what that money buys is specialization.

最后，這些錢買來的是專業(yè)化。

Again, using planes as an example, we have air superiority fighters, we have close air support planes, we have fighter bombers, and we have reconnaissance planes. These planes are only designed for one type of mission, its the only mission they practice and they do it extremely well. This is expensive, because now you have to maintain, 4 different kinds of jets, 4 sets of parts, sometimes different fuel requirements, 4 sets of pilots, 4 different bases, different training for mechanics........ect. Expensive.

再次以飛機(jī)為例，我們有制空戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)、近距離空中支援飛機(jī)、戰(zhàn)斗轟炸機(jī)和偵察機(jī)。這些飛機(jī)只為一種任務(wù)而設(shè)計(jì)，這是它們唯一練習(xí)的任務(wù)，而且它們做得非常出色。這很昂貴，因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在你必須維護(hù)4種不同的噴氣式飛機(jī)、4套零部件、有時(shí)不同的燃料要求、4套飛行員、4個(gè)不同的基地、機(jī)械師的不同培訓(xùn)等等。昂貴。

Other countries simply can’t afford that level of specialization. So they are forced to buy fewer, more generalized aircraft that can perform all of those roles. They don't have one plane for each role, they have one plane, the recce/fighter/CAS/bomber. But it is the jack of all trades who is master of none.

其他國家根本負(fù)擔(dān)不起這種程度的專業(yè)化。因此，他們被迫購買數(shù)量較少、更通用的飛機(jī)，這些飛機(jī)可以執(zhí)行所有這些任務(wù)。他們不是每種角色都有一架飛機(jī)，而是一架飛機(jī)，即偵察機(jī)/戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)/近距離空中支援飛機(jī)/轟炸機(jī)。但這正是樣樣通，樣樣松。

The planes, (not optimized for a particular role) aren't as good, and even then they still have problems finding parts and fuel for their pilots to train, who must now train 4 different kinds of missions, so their proficiency will be reduced as well.

這些飛機(jī)（沒有針對特定角色進(jìn)行優(yōu)化）性能不夠好，即便如此，他們?nèi)匀浑y以找到零部件和燃料供飛行員訓(xùn)練，而飛行員現(xiàn)在必須訓(xùn)練4種不同的任務(wù)，因此他們的熟練程度也會(huì)降低。

This is why we spend so much. It’s not that we have more tanks and planes and battleships, its that we really are that much better with the stuff we do have. That kind of specialization and training and the corresponding proficiency it brings just costs a lot.

這就是我們花費(fèi)如此之多的原因。并不是我們擁有更多的坦克、飛機(jī)和戰(zhàn)艦，而是我們確實(shí)能更好地利用我們擁有的東西。那種專業(yè)化、訓(xùn)練以及隨之而來的熟練程度需要大量的資金。

Competency, specialization, capability, bombs, fuel and parts. We have all of these things. Everyone else has to settle for 3 out of 6 if their lucky.

能力、專業(yè)化、實(shí)力、炸彈、燃料和零部件。我們擁有所有這些。如果幸運(yùn)的話，其他人只能滿足于六分之三。

Now what is the result of this expertise and specialization? Sheer, raw intimidation. The USAF hasn’t shot anyone down in 20 years because literally no one will mess with us! The last time we had fighter engagements in the first gulf war, Iraq’s air force was crippled in days. Instead of flying out to meet us in battle, they were burying their planes of flying them to Iran (their mortal enemy of a recent decade long war) just so we wouldn’t destroy them. And these were their hardened, battle tested pilots with hundreds of combat hours in the aforementioned war. And they were getting absolutely wrecked by our pilots, almost none of whom had any combat hours at all.

那么這種專業(yè)知識和專業(yè)化的結(jié)果是什么呢？純粹的、原始的威懾。美國空軍20年來沒有擊落過任何人，因?yàn)楦緵]有人敢惹我們！上次我們在第一次海灣戰(zhàn)爭中有戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)交戰(zhàn)時(shí)，伊拉克空軍在幾天內(nèi)就被摧毀了。他們沒有起飛與我們作戰(zhàn)，而是埋藏他們的飛機(jī)或?qū)⑺鼈冿w往伊朗（他們最近一場長達(dá)十年的戰(zhàn)爭中的死敵），只是為了不讓我們摧毀它們。而這些是他們身經(jīng)百戰(zhàn)、擁有數(shù)百小時(shí)戰(zhàn)斗經(jīng)驗(yàn)的飛行員。他們卻被我們幾乎沒有任何戰(zhàn)斗經(jīng)驗(yàn)的飛行員徹底擊潰。

It was the same story with the Army taking on the vaunted Republican Guard, the supposed elite battle tested force with tons of combat experience from the Iran Iraq war. We rolled up and smashed their entire army in 100 hours, mostly with boys who had only been out of boot camp for a few years.

陸軍對抗聲名顯赫的共和國衛(wèi)隊(duì)也是如此，共和國衛(wèi)隊(duì)是號稱精銳、身經(jīng)百戰(zhàn)的部隊(duì)，在兩伊戰(zhàn)爭中擁有豐富的戰(zhàn)斗經(jīng)驗(yàn)。我們迅速出擊，在100小時(shí)內(nèi)摧毀了他們的整個(gè)軍隊(duì)，而我們的大部分士兵都只是剛從新兵訓(xùn)練營出來幾年。

We live, they die. So badly in fact that it saves lives, because wars end quicker, or don’t start at all because our superior tactics and training we spend a ton of money to have makes the outcome of fighting the US military a predictable, foregone conclusion.

我們生，他們死。事實(shí)上，情況糟到這種程度反而能拯救生命，因?yàn)閼?zhàn)爭會(huì)更快結(jié)束，或者根本不會(huì)開始，因?yàn)槲覀兓ㄙM(fèi)巨資擁有的卓越戰(zhàn)術(shù)和訓(xùn)練使得與美國軍隊(duì)作戰(zhàn)的結(jié)果成為一個(gè)可預(yù)測的、早已注定的結(jié)論。

Jack Vony
This:

這個(gè)：

For Operation Desert Shield, the US military shipped hundreds of thousands of troops, millions of tons of ordnance, and tens of thousands of vehicles to Saudi Arabia, assembling a massive army in a few months. The US still keeps bases across the world operational and constantly transports troops, vehicles, and supplies almost anywhere in the world.

在沙漠盾牌行動(dòng)中，美國軍方向沙特阿拉伯運(yùn)送了數(shù)十萬士兵、數(shù)百萬噸彈藥和數(shù)萬輛車輛，在幾個(gè)月內(nèi)組建了一支龐大的軍隊(duì)。美國仍然保持著全球基地的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，并不斷地向世界幾乎任何地方運(yùn)輸部隊(duì)、車輛和補(bǔ)給。

No other country has a logistical chain like the United States. Other countries may build specific weapon systems to rival ours, or have large numbers to challenge our own, but no one does force projection like the US.

沒有其他國家擁有像美國這樣的后勤鏈。其他國家可能會(huì)制造特定的武器系統(tǒng)來與我們匹敵，或者擁有龐大的數(shù)量來挑戰(zhàn)我們，但沒有人能像美國那樣進(jìn)行力量投射。

While supply trucks and cargo ships are seen as mundane by most internet military enthusiasts, they are the reason for the US’s worldwide military presence and pedigree. Like Patton emphasized in his speech to the Third Army, the truck drivers and quartermasters are just as important as the men on the front line.

雖然補(bǔ)給卡車和貨船在大多數(shù)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)軍事愛好者看來很普通，但它們卻是美國在全球軍事存在和聲譽(yù)的原因。正如巴頓將軍在對第三集團(tuán)軍的講話中強(qiáng)調(diào)的那樣，卡車司機(jī)和軍需官與前線的士兵同樣重要。

Harmen Breedeveld
The US military’s greatest asset is visible from space: geography.

美國軍隊(duì)最大的資產(chǎn)從太空可見：地理位置。

A vast ocean to the East, and an even vaster ocean to the West. To the North friendly, culturally similar, stable and above all weaker Canada. To the South Mexico, a relatively friendly, less stable, but again weak country.

東邊是廣闊的海洋，西邊是更加廣闊的海洋。北邊是友好、文化相似、穩(wěn)定且最重要的是比我們?nèi)跣〉募幽么?。南邊是墨西哥，一個(gè)相對友好、不太穩(wěn)定、但同樣弱小的國家。

In other words: America is extraordinarily safe, being far removed from most threats.

換句話說：美國非常安全，因?yàn)樗h(yuǎn)離大多數(shù)威脅。

The challenges for any would-be attacker

任何潛在攻擊者面臨的挑戰(zhàn)

America’s geography creates logistical challenges for any adversary that are nearly impossible to overcome. How is this adversary even going to reach the US and sustain a campaign there?

美國的地理位置給任何對手都帶來了幾乎無法克服的后勤挑戰(zhàn)。這個(gè)對手將如何到達(dá)美國并在那里維持一場戰(zhàn)役？

Japan in World War II never seriously considered invading the American mainland. It was simply impossible.

二戰(zhàn)中的日本從未認(rèn)真考慮過入侵美國本土。這根本不可能。
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Compare America’s geography with that of Germany in World War II. Germany was surrounded by France, the UK and the USSR. It ended up into an endless two-front land war which steadily eroded its military abilities, while its cities and industries were under constant threat of allied bombers.

將美國的地理位置與二戰(zhàn)時(shí)期德國的地理位置進(jìn)行比較。德國被法國、英國和蘇聯(lián)包圍。它最終陷入了一場無休止的兩線陸地戰(zhàn)爭，這穩(wěn)步削弱了它的軍事能力，而它的城市和工業(yè)則受到盟軍轟炸機(jī)的威脅。

America is blessed with its geography.

美國得天獨(dú)厚，擁有優(yōu)越的地理位置。

Advantages for the US military as a result of geography

地理位置給美國軍隊(duì)帶來的優(yōu)勢
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The American military benefits from this geography in many ways. Some examples:

美國軍隊(duì)從這種地理位置中受益匪淺。以下是一些例子：

1.) Most would-be attackers simply never attack. One look at the map convinces most sane leaders to let go of any scheme to attack the US. The best war for any military is the one you need not even fight.

1.) 大多數(shù)潛在的攻擊者根本不會(huì)攻擊?？匆谎鄣貓D就能讓大多數(shù)理智的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人放棄任何攻擊美國的計(jì)劃。對于任何軍隊(duì)來說，最好的戰(zhàn)爭是不需要打的戰(zhàn)爭。

2.) Any adversary that does attack America itself, fights with near-insurmountable disadvantages. The English tried to end the American rebellion during the Revolutionary War. This meant a prolonged war across an ocean, against an enemy that fights close to its resources. England lost.

2.) 任何攻擊美國本土的對手，都將面臨幾乎無法克服的劣勢。英國在獨(dú)立戰(zhàn)爭期間試圖結(jié)束美國的反叛。這意味著一場跨越海洋的長期戰(zhàn)爭，對抗一個(gè)在其資源附近作戰(zhàn)的敵人。英國輸了。

Al Qaeda attacked the American mainland on 9/11. But it could not use its favoured means such as suicide bombers or roadside bombs, the distance made it impossible. Instead it had to rely on a more complicated scheme that was highly vulnerable to detection and disruption. It worked, but mostly because America was not paying attention. It is telling that Al Qaeda has not been able to repeat the attack.

基地組織在9/11襲擊了美國本土。但由于距離遙遠(yuǎn)，它無法使用其慣用的手段，如自殺式炸彈或路邊炸彈。相反，它不得不依賴一個(gè)更復(fù)雜的計(jì)劃，該計(jì)劃極易被發(fā)現(xiàn)和破壞。它成功了，但主要是因?yàn)槊绹?dāng)時(shí)沒有注意。具有諷刺意味的是，基地組織一直未能重復(fù)這次襲擊。

This all shows that the US military fights with huge benefits if it has to defend the mainland.

這一切都表明，如果美國軍隊(duì)必須保衛(wèi)本土，它將擁有巨大的優(yōu)勢。

3.) Most attacks are not on the mainland, giving America time to respond. Geography forces adversaries to strike outside of the mainland, giving America time to respond.

3.) 大多數(shù)襲擊都不是針對本土的，這給了美國時(shí)間做出反應(yīng)。地理位置迫使對手在美國本土以外發(fā)動(dòng)襲擊，這給了美國時(shí)間做出反應(yīng)。

The best example is the war with Japan in World War II. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, a devastating strike, but not one that threatened America itself. The American people, the factories, the shipyards where America was already constructing its new fleets, all were safe. No bombings, no invasions, no disruptions.

最好的例子是二戰(zhàn)中與日本的戰(zhàn)爭。日本襲擊了珍珠港，這是一次毀滅性的打擊，但并沒有威脅到美國本土。美國人民、工廠、美國已經(jīng)開始建造新艦隊(duì)的造船廠，都安然無恙。沒有轟炸，沒有入侵，沒有破壞。

America had time to recover from the shock and to mobilize its population and industry to crank out a massive army and navy and to take the war to Japan (and to Germany).

美國有時(shí)間從震驚中恢復(fù)過來，并動(dòng)員其人口和工業(yè)，制造出龐大的陸軍和海軍，并將戰(zhàn)爭帶到日本（和德國）。

America even had the luxury of being able to spend massive resources on a wild-eyed crazy idea: a nuclear weapon.

美國甚至有奢侈的條件，能夠?qū)⒋罅抠Y源投入到一個(gè)異想天開的想法上：核武器。

4.) Most wars America does fight are wars of choice. Because America is so safe from enemies, most of the wars it fights are wars of choice. Usually one chooses war with a decidedly weaker, politically isolated country.

4.) 美國打的大多數(shù)戰(zhàn)爭都是選擇性的戰(zhàn)爭。因?yàn)槊绹绱税踩馐軘橙说耐{，它打的大多數(shù)戰(zhàn)爭都是選擇性的戰(zhàn)爭。通常，它會(huì)選擇與一個(gè)明顯較弱、政治上孤立的國家開戰(zhàn)。

And that is nice for the military and for the average soldier. Sure, fighting the Vietcong in Vietnam or Sunni extremists in Iraq is bad, but it is a hell of a lot better than sitting in a foxhole watching a Soviet armed division rolling at you.

這對軍隊(duì)和普通士兵來說是好事。當(dāng)然，在越南與越共作戰(zhàn)或在伊拉克與遜尼派極端分子作戰(zhàn)很糟糕，但這比坐在散兵坑里看著一支蘇聯(lián)重裝師向你開來要好得多。

4a.) America can walk away from its wars of choice. Even a war of choice can go spectacularly wrong. Think of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. But then the magic happens: America can end them by walking away. The Vietnam war ended because America gave up. Same for the Iraq war. And rest assured, the same will go for the Afghanistan war.

4a.) 美國可以從它選擇的戰(zhàn)爭中抽身而退。即使是選擇的戰(zhàn)爭也可能慘敗。想想越南、伊拉克和阿富汗。但隨后奇跡發(fā)生了：美國可以通過抽身而退來結(jié)束這些戰(zhàn)爭。越南戰(zhàn)爭的結(jié)束是因?yàn)槊绹艞壛?。伊拉克?zhàn)爭也是如此。請放心，阿富汗戰(zhàn)爭也將如此。

Few countries can so easily walk away from war. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq could not walk away when America invaded. Nor could the Taliban’s Afghanistan. The leadership and its supporters had to choose between fighting and losing all they held dear.

很少有國家能如此輕易地從戰(zhàn)爭中抽身。當(dāng)美國入侵時(shí)，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因的伊拉克無法抽身。塔利班的阿富汗也無法抽身。其領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層和支持者不得不選擇戰(zhàn)斗，否則將失去他們珍視的一切。

Not so for America. When it walks away, its oceans again protect it, and peace returns. No need for the army to wage endless war.

美國則不然。當(dāng)它抽身離去時(shí)，其海洋再次保護(hù)著它，和平也隨之歸來。軍隊(duì)無需進(jìn)行無休止的戰(zhàn)爭。

So there you have it: geography. The greatest asset of America’s military.

就是這樣：地理。這是美國軍隊(duì)最大的優(yōu)勢。

Karl Milhon
It is the individual soldier/Marine. Most military forces are trained and trained to follow orders. A French Soldier in Afganistan that worked with American units noted” “ In fact, is the basic philosophy of both British and Continental soldiers. 'In the absence of orders, take a defensive position.' Indeed, virtually every army in the world. The American soldier and Marine, however, are imbued from early in their training with the ethos: In the Absence of Orders: Attack! Where other forces, for good or ill, will wait for precise orders and plans to respond to an attack or any other 'incident', the American force will simply go, counting on firepower and SOP to carry the day”

是單兵/海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員。大多數(shù)軍隊(duì)都被訓(xùn)練成服從命令。一位曾在阿富汗與美軍合作的法國士兵注意到：“事實(shí)上，這是英國和歐洲大陸士兵的基本理念?！跊]有命令的情況下，采取防御姿態(tài)。’的確，世界上幾乎所有軍隊(duì)都是如此。然而，美國士兵和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員在早期訓(xùn)練中就被灌輸了一種信條：在沒有命令的情況下：進(jìn)攻！其他部隊(duì)，無論好壞，都會(huì)等待明確的命令和計(jì)劃來應(yīng)對襲擊或任何其他‘事件’，而美軍則會(huì)直接行動(dòng)，依靠火力和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作業(yè)程序來取勝?！?/b>
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://m.mintwatchbillionaireclub.com 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處

So, first it appears we have a different attitude AND training. Historically also, our individualism AND core marksmanship tied to our rural background and every boy with a gun in his hand likely played a role. I can speak to that in that I grew up with a rifle in my hand and shot almost perfect in Boot Camp rifle range in the early 70’s. If you have never held a weapon in your life and then are given one it is different than growing up with one and knowing how to use it almost instinctively. I could see it in other recruits eyes, and the initially awkward way they held their weapons.

因此，首先看來我們擁有不同的態(tài)度和訓(xùn)練。歷史上，我們的個(gè)人主義和與農(nóng)村背景相關(guān)的核心射擊技能，以及每個(gè)男孩手中都可能有槍，可能也發(fā)揮了作用。我對此深有體會(huì)，因?yàn)槲覐男【湍弥綐岄L大，在 70 年代初的新兵訓(xùn)練營射擊場幾乎彈無虛發(fā)。如果你一生從未拿過武器，然后才被給予一把，這與從小就擁有武器并幾乎憑本能就知道如何使用它是有區(qū)別的。我可以在其他新兵的眼中看到這一點(diǎn)，以及他們最初握持武器的笨拙姿勢。

In addition, there are myriad examples of 20th Century US units losing their officers and NCO’s and privates and lance corporals just step up. Our NCO corps are noted. Take a look at a list of medal of honor recipients and read the short summaries of what the lowest level privates to NCO’s did. Their actions reflect what I am saying. AND these were just the ones that got the medal of honor. You go down the heirarchy of medals and you will see huge numbers of examples of what I am talking about.

此外，20 世紀(jì)有無數(shù)例子表明，美國部隊(duì)在失去軍官和士官后，士兵和下士會(huì)挺身而出。我們的士官隊(duì)伍是著名的?？纯礃s譽(yù)勛章獲得者的名單，讀一下最低級別的士兵到士官所做的事的簡短總結(jié)。他們的行動(dòng)反映了我所說的。而且這些僅僅是獲得榮譽(yù)勛章的人。如果你查看更低級別的勛章，你會(huì)看到大量我所說的例子。

Now you could say hey, I bet there are examples of this in other armies and I would have to agree, but, in general, you see foreign troops doing what that French soldier noted as in waiting for orders, going defensive and not offensive. And yes this is a generalization but I remember being in Marines. They wanted me to do “what” they said when they said it and not question it, but they didn’t take away my ability to think and expected me to maintain situational awareness and to act on it AND even listened and adjusted their plans when I had tactical observations that improved our situation. It never occurred to me that I should “not reason why.” I made meritorious Corporal and meritorious Sergeant as a result for things they didn’t give medals for in a situation that never happened…

現(xiàn)在你可能會(huì)說，嘿，我敢打賭其他軍隊(duì)也有這樣的例子，我無法否定，但是，總的來說，你會(huì)看到外國軍隊(duì)做那位法國士兵所說的那樣，等待命令，采取防御而不是進(jìn)攻。是的，這是一種概括，但我記得我在海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的時(shí)候。他們希望我在他們說的時(shí)候就做他們說的“什么”，不要質(zhì)疑，但他們并沒有剝奪我的思考能力，并期望我保持態(tài)勢感知并采取行動(dòng)，甚至在我提出能夠改善我們局勢的戰(zhàn)術(shù)觀察時(shí)，他們還會(huì)傾聽并調(diào)整他們的計(jì)劃。我從未想過我不應(yīng)該“不問為什么”。結(jié)果，我因在從未發(fā)生過的情況下所做的一些沒有獲得勛章的事情而晉升為優(yōu)秀下士和優(yōu)秀中士……

AND, most of the Marines around me were not a lot different… Of course we were a group of forward observers naval gunfire liaison, kind of special forces before they had a name for it but hey, we were just regular Marines. We worked with other NATO forces for a few months at one point. One thing I noticed was a lot of looking at their NCO’s and officers in situations. The Brits were tight. The Italians seemed more interested in looking good than anything and the Turks were individually scary but looked to officers more than anyone else… This was like 1974 and we got to meet the Turks under other conditions later in Cyprus… I didn’t forget my impressions…

而且，我周圍的大多數(shù)海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員也差不多……當(dāng)然，我們是一群前沿觀察員，海軍炮火聯(lián)絡(luò)員，有點(diǎn)像在特種部隊(duì)這個(gè)名稱出現(xiàn)之前的特種部隊(duì)，但嘿，我們只是普通的海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員。我們曾在某個(gè)時(shí)候與其他北約部隊(duì)合作了幾個(gè)月。我注意到的一件事是，在各種情況下，他們很多人都會(huì)看著他們的士官和軍官。英國人很嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)。意大利人似乎更注重外表而不是其他，而土耳其人單兵作戰(zhàn)很可怕，但比任何人都更依賴軍官……那大約是 1974 年，后來我們在塞浦路斯的其他情況下遇到了土耳其人……我沒有忘記我的印象……

Example: I remember one example of being in a command tent with forces from three countries in it. We all had radios and were communicating with individual units but on the same freq on one. At one point someone came on the radio and they were obviously civilians speaking broken English and then other languages and I have no idea how they got on that freq but there they were. I specifically remember the other operators from the UK, Italian and then U.S. getting it. I remember the other operators looking to their officers on what to do having to get their attention as they were talking to each other.

舉例：我記得有一次，我和來自三個(gè)國家的部隊(duì)在一個(gè)指揮帳篷里。我們都有無線電，并與各自的部隊(duì)通信，但在一個(gè)共同的頻率上。有一次，有人通過無線電講話，他們顯然是說蹩腳英語和其他語言的平民，我不知道他們是如何進(jìn)入那個(gè)頻率的，但他們就在那里。我特別記得來自英國、意大利和美國的其他操作員明白了情況。我記得其他操作員看著他們的軍官，詢問該怎么做，因?yàn)檐姽賯冋诨ハ嘟徽劊麄儾坏貌灰疖姽俚淖⒁狻?/b>

I remember our comm Sergeant just taking the comm and responding WITHOUT looking for guidance from anyone higher and telling them they were on a restricted and incorrect frequency and to get off. I remember us all laughing at his low “official voice” with a mean tone. We were the only ones laughing as the other radio operators were looking at us as the officers started paying attention. Oh, the Sergeant then asked the Major about the need for us to change frequencies as a result. Our Light Colonel or Major can’t remember said thanks Sergeant and started talking to the other officers. This then led to a big deal as the officers conferred with their higher ups and as a result, we had to change freqs in the middle of the day for the entire operation and all the units. I still remember that NSA owned PRC (Prick) with the metal box that you poked the numbers on the back they gave you and then stuck it into the radio to code the freq. I had to carry that heavy bastard…

我記得我們的通信中士直接拿起通信設(shè)備并回復(fù)，沒有向上級尋求任何指示，而是告訴他們他們在一個(gè)受限且錯(cuò)誤的頻率上，讓他們離開。我記得我們都嘲笑他帶著一絲刻薄的低沉“官方聲音”。只有我們在笑，因?yàn)槠渌麩o線電操作員看著我們，而軍官們開始注意。哦，中士隨后詢問少校我們是否需要因此更改頻率。我們的中?；蛏傩＃ㄓ洸磺辶耍┱f了聲謝謝中士，然后開始與其他軍官交談。這隨后變成了一件大事，因?yàn)檐姽賯兣c他們的上級進(jìn)行了商議，結(jié)果，我們不得不在白天為整個(gè)行動(dòng)和所有部隊(duì)更改頻率。我仍然記得那個(gè)美國國家安全局擁有的 PRC（討厭的東西），它有一個(gè)金屬盒子，你把他們給你的數(shù)字戳在后面，然后把它插到無線電里來編碼頻率。我不得不扛著那個(gè)沉重的家伙……

Now, you are probably going what does this have to do with the difference and the US greatest asset. Here it is. Something happened. the other forces looked to their officers, (friction) our Sergeant just handled it without thought and then observing a compromise of our secrecy triggered higher levels to address a potential strategic impact (initiative) and the officer responded like no big deal…(Job done).

現(xiàn)在，你可能會(huì)問這與差異和美國最大的優(yōu)勢有什么關(guān)系。答案就在這里。事情發(fā)生了。其他部隊(duì)看著他們的軍官（摩擦），我們的中士只是毫不猶豫地處理了這件事，然后觀察到我們機(jī)密性的泄露觸發(fā)了更高級別的人員來處理潛在的戰(zhàn)略影響（主動(dòng)性），而軍官的反應(yīng)就像沒什么大不了的……（任務(wù)完成）。

We were definitely more casual with our officers but not disrespectful. But, the lower level Marine had no problem taking the initiative and solving the problem with zero friction in the process. We just did it and our three officers in the tent took it for granted… The other soldiers from two other countries looked to their officers for something as simple as that. What do they do in combat? But that little illustrative difference is the difference between U.S. and them in my opinion. I have thought on this very thing on what is the difference between our forces and theirs long and hard. And this example wasn’t what I did that led to my promotions. But the same dynamics were in play…

我們對待軍官的態(tài)度肯定更隨意，但并非不敬。但是，較低級別的海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員毫不費(fèi)力地采取主動(dòng)并解決了問題，整個(gè)過程沒有任何摩擦。我們只是做了，而帳篷里的三位軍官則認(rèn)為這是理所當(dāng)然的……來自其他兩個(gè)國家的士兵對于如此簡單的事情都依賴他們的軍官。他們在戰(zhàn)斗中會(huì)做什么？但在我看來，這個(gè)小小的說明性差異就是美國和他們之間的區(qū)別。我長期以來一直在思考我們的部隊(duì)和他們的部隊(duì)之間的區(qū)別。而這個(gè)例子并不是我晉升的原因。但同樣的動(dòng)態(tài)也在發(fā)揮作用……

Clifford Terry
In a true war situation, the greatest asset any country’s military possesses is its country’s economic base. A country possessing a strong economic base but a weak military is generally in a superior position to a country possessing a strong military but a weak economic base. The situation of the US vis-a-vis Japan in 1941 clearly demonstrates this. Though aspects of the US military at that time were strong, the overall rating was not, especially as compared to the Japanese military. The overall size of the US Navy was larger than Japan’s but was divided between two oceans thus dropping the power of the Pacific Fleet to less than that of Japan. The US Naval air arm was not only smaller than Japan’s but the Japanese airmen were well experienced having been at war since Japan invaded China years earlier. The US Army was small and divided between force allocations for the Pacific and the Atlantic regions. And so on and so forth - in 90% of all categories for consideration.

在真正的戰(zhàn)爭局勢中，任何國家軍隊(duì)擁有的最大資產(chǎn)是其國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)。一個(gè)擁有強(qiáng)大經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)但軍事力量薄弱的國家，通常比一個(gè)擁有強(qiáng)大軍事力量但經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)薄弱的國家處于更有利的地位。1941 年美國與日本的局勢清楚地表明了這一點(diǎn)。盡管當(dāng)時(shí)美國軍隊(duì)的某些方面很強(qiáng)大，但整體實(shí)力并不強(qiáng)，尤其與日本軍隊(duì)相比更是如此。美國海軍的總體規(guī)模大于日本，但由于分布在兩個(gè)大洋，導(dǎo)致太平洋艦隊(duì)的實(shí)力不如日本。美國海軍航空兵不僅規(guī)模小于日本，而且日本飛行員經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富，因?yàn)槿毡驹缭趲啄昵叭肭种袊鴷r(shí)就已處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài)。美國陸軍規(guī)模較小，兵力分配在太平洋和大西洋地區(qū)之間。諸如此類——在 90% 的考慮類別中都是如此。

However, Japan had not only NOT the economic power immediately available to the US but had a very small potential power level for future use. And this was the area that swamped Japan because the US possessed a massive potential power level - one that could only have one possible equal at that time, the Soviet unx.

然而，日本不僅沒有美國當(dāng)時(shí)可用的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力，而且未來的潛在實(shí)力也非常小。而這正是日本被擊垮的領(lǐng)域，因?yàn)槊绹鴵碛芯薮蟮臐撛趯?shí)力——當(dāng)時(shí)唯一可能與之匹敵的只有蘇聯(lián)。

So, the US refusal to surrender immediately after Pearl Harbor doomed Japan at the point of the highest Japanese military achievement.

因此，在美國在珍珠港事件后拒絕立即投降的那一刻，日本在其軍事成就的頂峰時(shí)期就注定了失敗。
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://m.mintwatchbillionaireclub.com 轉(zhuǎn)載請注明出處

However, bear in mind that in the event of a nuclear conflict the result of a massive nuclear exchange negates both immediate as well as potential economic strength. This is why studies have shown that there can be no winners in such an event.

然而，請記住，在核沖突的情況下，大規(guī)模核交換的結(jié)果會(huì)抵消即時(shí)的和潛在的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力。這就是為什么研究表明，在這樣的事件中不會(huì)有贏家。

美國 軍隊(duì) 資產(chǎn)

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QA回答：美國軍隊(duì)最大的資產(chǎn)是什么？

QA回答：美國軍隊(duì)最大的資產(chǎn)是什么？